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ABSTRACT 
 
Unmet Needs for Emergency Organizations During Disaster: Red Cross and Salvation 
Army Referrals in Texas During Katrina-Rita, 2005. (April 2010) 
 
Alexandria Norman 
Department of Landscape Architecture and Urban Planning 
Texas A&M University 
 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Sherry Bame 




The purpose of this study is to examine unmet needs for key emergency organizations - 
Red Cross and Salvation Army - in Texas during Katrina and Rita Hurricanes, 2005.  
Using Texas 2-1-1 data from 8/1/05 – 12/31/05 (N=635,983 calls), referrals to these 
organizations will be examined by location and disaster phase.  This is the first time that 
“real time” disaster unmet needs of this geographic scope have been examined. The 
findings will help disaster organizations better understand unmet needs for their services 
at disaster sites and evacuation destinations.  
 
Results show that major metropolitan areas have high volume of need for access to Red 
Cross.  Harris County stands out with three times greater needs for Red Cross support.  
After adjusting for urban/rural bias, metropolitan counties have expected number of Red 
Cross needs per 1,000 households.  In adjusted findings, there is a striking focus of Red 
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Cross unmet needs to the disaster area, especially Jasper County and surrounding area.  
For Salvation Army, the highest volume of unmet needs is in largest metropolitan 
counties as primary evacuation destinations.  There is an exception of Lubbock County 
which had a local initiative for a non-disaster Salvation Army program.  When adjusted 
by population size, disaster area and evacuation destinations have expected levels of 
unmet needs for Salvation Army.  Taylor (Abilene) and Lubbock Counties had high 
demand for access to Salvation Army for local programs.         
 
Less densely populated areas surrounding location of Hurricane Rita landfall were at 
“high-risk”.  More densely populated areas are better able to absorb needs of evacuees, 
while less densely populated communities are “high-risk” for unmet needs.  For future 
disaster management possible recommendations include long-term recovery supplies in 
less populated areas near disaster sites, distribution of supplies along evacuation routes, 
and recovery centers located in surrounding communities to help evacuees return home.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Motivation for research 
The purpose of the study is to examine unmet needs for help from emergency 
organizations, namely, Salvation Army and Red Cross, during hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita, Fall 2005 in Texas. Use of these organizations’ services is well documented for 
disaster events. However, little is known about access barriers to their services. A unique 
opportunity exists to measure unmet needs for Red Cross and Salvation Army services 
using Texas 2-1-1 data collected in “real time” before, during, and up to four months 
following Katrina-Rita. Texas’ Emergency Management Office appointed the 2-1-1 
Network as the State’s communication hub during Katrina-Rita, linking callers with 
unmet non-emergency needs to available disaster and community services (Bame, et al., 
2009a).  Analysis of unmet needs for these emergency services over time and location 
will enable better planning by these emergency response organizations to reduce access 
barriers for more effective distribution of services and resources. 
 
Similar to 9-1-1 for emergency needs, the FCC approved 2-1-1 as a three-digit number 
for information and referral regarding non-emergency services in 2000.  In 2004, Texas  
completed its statewide 2-1-1 Information & Referral Network (TIRN, 2009), comprised 
_______________ 
This thesis follows the style of Journal of the American Planning Association. 
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of 25 regional programs where staff handled individual calls for information and 
referrals. In 2005, the 2-1-1 Texas Network was ready for the vast support network 
mobilized to help Katrina and Rita victims in Texas (2-1-1, 2009). Road signs for 2-1-1 
were posted for Katrina evacuees evacuating into Texas. Rita evacuees and host 
communities used 2-1-1 to search for services needed anywhere in Texas (Bame, et al., 
2009b). Staff and volunteers provided information and referrals to available, appropriate, 
and/or affordable services, at the same time logging the caller’s location and unmet 
needs. To date, no disaster research has examined this statewide response for unmet 
needs both at disaster sites and evacuation destinations. 
 
Salvation Army provided 5.6 million meals, assisted 3.3 million people, and donated a 
total of $382 million for helping Katrina victims (The Salvation Army, 2009).  In 2005 
for Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma, American Red Cross spent $227 million on 
food and shelter with nearly 500,000 hurricane survivors staying in Red Cross shelters 
(American Red Cross, 2009).  But what about people who encountered barriers in 
accessing these emergency services?  The media reported many anecdotes of problems 
obtaining emergency help during both Katrina and Rita hurricanes. This research will 
investigate “real time” requests throughout Texas for access to these emergency 
organizations. Understanding systematic patterns of these unmet needs over disaster 
phases and locations can help emergency organizations to better reduce access barriers 
for populations at risk during future disasters. 
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Review of research 
There has already been a large array of literature regarding management of and recovery 
from Hurricanes Rita and Katrina.  The United States Government Accountability Office 
itself produced several accounts of the impact and recovery process.  There were several 
Congressional Committees that have reviewed information regarding Hurricanes Katrina 
and Hurricane Rita. Since the topic of funding from FEMA was a popular and much 
criticized issue during the disasters’ aftermath, there were also several news articles, as 
well as Government Accountability Office reports, regarding this. FEMA had a surplus 
of information in relation to its involvement in Hurricanes Katrina and Rita; however, 
information on Red Cross and Salvation Army services during Katrina and Rita was less 
published.  
 
Hurricane Katrina made landfall as a category 4 hurricane on August 29, 2009 (Brodie, 
et al., 2006: 1402).  As thousands of people evacuated the New Orleans area, “the public 
health community asked what it could do to protect victims’ health and promote their 
recovery and what lessons it could learn to better plan for a future storm or other 
disaster” (Brodie, et al., 2006: 1402).  Studies have shown that through the course of any 
given storm, there will always be people who do not evacuate and will need rescue and 
aid afterward (Brodie, et al., 2006: 1402).  Higher income families, disabled residents, as 
well as residents with family in a location to evacuate to are more prone to evacuate 
(Brodie, et al., 2006: 1402).  According to Brodie’s survey, one quarter of people 
interviewed mentioned National Guard, Coast Guard or military as an organization that 
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helped most during the storms, while 19% mentioned private organizations, such as the 
Red Cross or Salvation Army (Brodie, et al, 2006: 1405).  Evacuation has been shown to 
be at a higher rate if the household trusts the source of information and has clear 
instructions.  In the case of New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina, approximately one third 
of the evacuees surveyed in the Houston shelters reported that they had not heard an 
evacuation order, and around thirty percent that had heard the order believed that no 
clear information about how to evacuate was provided (Brodie, et al., 2006: 1404). 
 
Hurricane Katrina produced the largest relocation of people in the United States since 
the Dust Bowl in the 1930s (Nigg, 2006).  The Dust Bowl resulted in the migration of 
300,000 to 400,000 citizens from the southern plains states to California; however, this 
took place over several years.  An estimated 1.2 million people evacuated from New 
Orleans within a matter of hours and days before Hurricane Katrina made landfall.  
Another 100,000 to 120,000 people were in a second evacuation that occurred after 
flooding had increased, which, in turn, increased the demand for shelter and supplies 
needed.     
 
Hurricane Katrina resulted in the largest one-time response “in the history of American 
philanthropy or the world for that matter” (WDSU, 2007).  A total of $4.25 billion was 
donated to Hurricane Katrina relief.  American Red Cross collected the most money, 
approximately $2.1 billion, from all around the world after the storm.  Within a month of 
landfall, 75 percent, or $1.5 billion, was spent, according to Trent Stamp, the president 
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of watchdog group Charity Navigator (WDSU, 2007).  The CEO of the Southeast 
Louisiana chapter of American Red Cross, Kay Wilkins, stated that a large quantity of 
the funds went to shelter and food for evacuees (WDSU, 2007).  Wilkins also said that 
the Red Cross had established shelters for evacuees in 24 states.  Although the majority 
of the money was used immediately after the storm, The Red Cross saved around $193 
million for long-term hurricane recovery programs (WDSU, 2007).   
 
After the Red Cross’ establishment in 1881, efforts were started to relieve the Great Fire 
of 1881 in the Thumb area of Michigan and eight years later, the Great Flood of 1889 in 
Johnstown Pennsylvania [see Table A.1.1 History of the Red Cross] (American Red 
Cross, 2009).  Soon after this, Red Cross was granted a Congressional Charter and is still 
the only volunteer service organization to earn this title (Brudney and Gazley, 2009).  In 
World War II efforts, the Red Cross was asked to begin charging for nominal items due 
to the fact that other organizations found it necessary to do so (American Red Cross, 
2009).  Over the last century, Red Cross has made several technological advances such 
as completing a transformation into re-engineered blood services and implementing a 
nucleic acid testing study (American Red Cross, 2009).  After the Terrorist Attacks of 
9/11, Red Cross solicited funds and donations for those affected.  During Red Cross’ 
efforts with Hurricane Katrina recovery, fundraising goals were met to ensure the needs 
of the victims (American Red Cross, 2009).  Most recently, Red Cross has spent $15 
million on Midwestern flood victims (American Red Cross, 2009).     
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In just two weeks after Katrina made landfall, the Red Cross raised $439.5 million 
(American Red Cross, 2009).  Due to the hurricanes, basic amenities were demanded at 
ten to twenty times greater than any other disaster that the Red Cross had dealt with in 
their existence of 125 years (American Red Cross, 2009).  Volunteers came from forty-
seven states, three territories, and the District of Columbia in a combined effort that 
resulted in ninety-five percent of the Red Cross’ efforts (American Red Cross, 2009).  
Although FEMA did provide temporary shelter for Katrina evacuees, Red Cross played a 
much larger role in supplying emergency, or immediate, sheltering. The Red Cross 
opened approximately 1400 shelters during the disaster that sheltered 3.8 million 
overnight stays and 68 million meals (American Red Cross, 2009).  Five days after 
Katrina hit, the Red Cross served a record breaking 995,000 hot meals, which is five 
times the average number of meals served on a single day following a disaster 
(American Red Cross, 2009).     
 
In the aftermath of the 2005 Hurricane Season, Red Cross stated that they learned many 
valuable lessons that could be spread to many other Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGO’s) as well.  Some things that Red Cross has done to improve their organization for 
future disasters includes expanding operating capacity as well as developing and 
strengthening partnerships with local communities.  Additionally, Red Cross has vastly 
increased the amount of warehouse space for disaster response supplies and has also 
created new ways to maintain communication systems after existing communication 
infrastructure has been disabled by disasters (American Red Cross, 2009).     
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Although on a smaller scale monetarily compared to the Red Cross, the Salvation Army 
also serves as a primary disaster response agency in the U.S [see Table A.1.2 History of 
Salvation Army].  Through the devastation and destruction of coastlines in Alabama, 
Louisiana Mississippi, and Texas, and the death of 1600 residents, the Salvation Army 
provided support for families in need after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (The Salvation 
Army, 2009).  During 2005 hurricane season, immediate needs of survivors of Katrina, 
Rita and Wilma were met by the Salvation Army provision of meals, shelter, and 
donations.  The Salvation Army served 5.6 million meals and assisted 3.3 million people 
with the help of $382 million in donations.  The Salvation Army continues to serve those 
affected by Katrina through long-term clean up and restoration efforts, as well as 
providing financial and social service support to survivors.  Additionally, spiritual and 
emotional support were offered to individuals and families that were impacted by the 
disasters.   
 
Throughout history, The Salvation Army has provided support for some of the major 
disasters that have resulted in vast devastation.  In 1900, the Galveston Hurricane 
became the organization’s first major response (The Salvation Army, 2008).  After 
Hurricane destroyed the city of Galveston and caused over 5,000 deaths, volunteers 
moved to the Galveston area and cleaned, fed, and sheltered thousands of survivors.  The 
San Francisco Earthquake of 1906 with a 8.25 magnitude lead to fires throughout the 
city for 3 days as well as more than 3,000 deaths.  During the recovery efforts the 
Salvation Army fed 30,000 people, sheltered 9,000 and donated $15,000.  The 9/11 
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Terrorist Attacks in 2001 were the next major disaster that the Salvation Army 
responded to.  Relief workers are Ground Zero were served food by solely the Salvation 
Army as well as given emotional and spiritual support.  3.2 million meals were served, 
39,000 people were assisted, 1 million volunteer hours were provided and $90 million 
were donated during the months following the Attacks.  The Indian Ocean Earthquake in 
2004 lead to 200,000 deaths in East Asia.  Restoration and long-term recovery work 
were provided by the Salvation Army.  Approximately 2,200 homes are in the process of 
being constructed, 250,000 people were assisted and $43 million were donated to the 
cause.  The most recent disaster that the Salvation Army has responded to is Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005. 
 
The Salvation Army also has several programs within the organization that provide 
support.  The organization provides Community and Fellowship services through Kroc 
Community Centers, Youth Camps and Recreation (The Salvation Army, 2009).  
Comfort and Support services are created though Christmas Charity, Elderly Services 
and Community Cares Ministries.  Rebuilding Lives services include Disaster Relief, 
Prisoner Rehabilitation and Fight Human Trafficking.  The Salvation Army’s Disaster 
Relief program is often a first responder after a disaster.  Trained officers are able to 
assist with a wide range of emergencies and provide food, shelter, clothing and spiritual 
comfort.    
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Research questions 
Research Objective: To determine variation in volume of unmet needs in Texas 
for emergency disaster services from a) Red Cross, and b) Salvation Army during 
Katrina-Rita, Fall 2005, by:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Caller location:  
Unmet needs for Red Cross and for Salvation Army help will differ by 
disaster sites vs. evacuation destinations. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Disaster phase:  
Unmet needs for Red Cross and for Salvation Army help will differ by 
disaster phase:  evacuation vs. landfall vs. immediate post landfall vs. 
short-term recovery vs. long term recovery).  
 
 
It should be noted that the above hypotheses predict differences in unmet needs for a) 
Red Cross and b) Salvation Army per location, phase, and population characteristics. 
The direction and magnitude of these differences were not specified as this is the first 
empirical analysis of this topic.  No literature has been found to date as a conceptual or 
theoretical basis for such types of predictions, nor empirical evidence for contrasting one 
group vs. another.   
 
The findings will be described for each hypothesis for each organization -- Red Cross 
and Salvation Army. Then the trends will be compared between Red Cross and Salvation 
Army. Moreover, unmet needs by location over time will also be compared for the two 
organizations. Population differences by location will be described, leading to 
recommendations for future research controlling for these population differences. Thus, 
this is an empirical, descriptive investigation of unmet needs for help to meet needs for 
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shelter, food, clothing and other basic needs that the Red Cross and Salvation Army 
provided as first responders in Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in Texas, 2005. 
 
Scope of study 
As previously stated, a unique opportunity exists to measure needs for help from and 
referral to Red Cross and Salvation Army.  There has been little to no research done 
reviewing access barriers to the services that Red Cross and Salvation Army provide. A 
total of 635,983 2-1-1 calls were recorded in Texas from 8/1/05 to 12/31/05.  This 
analysis is the first time that “real time” disaster data of this geographic scope have been 
examined.     
 
In the field of Urban and Regional Science, there is a need to improve emergency plans 
for evacuations in urban settings.  Due to the fact that the population of America is aging 
as well as moving into more urban settings, planners are faced with new challenges 
when considering disaster evacuation and recovery.  The importance of disaster planning 
is increasing as the population of America becomes older and more urbanized.  As stated 
by Brudney and Gazley, “governmental responses to domestic disasters have 
emphasized the important role played by a sometimes extensive network of 
decentralized, voluntary organizations in emergency response” (Brudney and Gazley, 
2009).  In their article, Planning to be Prepared: An Empirical Examination of the Role 
of Voluntary Organizations in Country Government Emergency Planning, Brudney and 
Gazley go on to state that coordination between local governments and voluntary 
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organizations would improve their ability to respond to disasters.  Cities should be better 
prepared to assist those with special needs who are unable to evacuate independently. 
Rural communities need to anticipate disaster and evacuation needs with fewer resources 
to support their disaster planning efforts.  In low-income areas, there needs to be better 
communication of how to evacuate or shelter safely with lesser resiliency for 
transportation and housing.  Although 100% evacuation has always been impossible, 
better planning is needed for all communities to prepare for major disasters and to host 
large-scale evacuations.   
 
Red Cross and Salvation Army have played major roles as first responders for disasters 
occurring over the past century.  Determining the caller location for unmet needs will 
enable Red Cross and Salvation Army to be more efficiently prepared for meeting 
disasters by having supplies and workers located in close proximity to high-need areas.  
Identifying the disaster phases will assist the organizations in allotting supplies and 
funds throughout the various time periods of the disaster, which will better estimate what 
type and how much of a service or need to be prepared for use.   Knowing the population 
characteristics will give the organizations specific information that will be used to locate 
areas that have specific needs, such as more evacuation buses for areas of high density, 
more medical supplies for areas with high proportions of disabilities, or temporary or 
permanent free shelters for counties will low median income and high unemployment 
rates.  This information, once relayed to Red Cross and Salvation Army will show them 
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areas that need improvement in their system and give them a better warning of which 
services are needed when and where.    





The study population includes all 2-1-1 call data from Fall 2005 collected by the Texas 
2-1-1 Information and Referral Network (TIRN) from the 25 Area Information Center 
(AIC) programs.  All 2-1-1 calls from 8/1/05 through 12/31/05 were included, with any 
caller identification information deleted. August 1 – August 22 was taken as the baseline 
prior to Katrina landfall.  Data were analyzed through December 31 in order to include 
recovery.  During the surge of disaster calls, the Texas 2-1-1 AICs captured all calls on a 
rollover basis; for example, calls to Fort Worth AIC could be answered in San Antonio 
AIC.  Approximately 8-10% of the population of Texas had used 2-1-1 prior to the 
hurricanes.  This number increased significantly in Fall 2005 due to 2-1-1 serving as an 
emergency communication hub for non-emergency needs from Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita plus ongoing community needs.  
 
Limitations of the study population included missing populations with lack of awareness 
of 2-1-1 services. The Texas 2-1-1 program had existed only for a year prior to Katrina-
Rita and there had been little marketing done during that initial year. Signs were posted 
along evacuation routes that instructed drivers to “call 2-1-1 for help” for disaster-related 
information and referral. Others were told by emergency and community services to use 
2-1-1 for their other needs. The study does not include people who were able to meet 
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their own needs through either private or public means and those without a working cell 
phone or landline.   
 
Individuals also may have known about the services, but the services might not have 
been available at the right time and/or location.  Affordability was another access barrier 
that can affect the number of callers.  Callers may not have been aware of financial aid 
that was available and therefore would not have bothered calling 2-1-1.  Acceptance of 
language, social status, race, ethnicity, age and gender may also have been factors that 
may have discouraged evacuees from calling 2-1-1. Another population not included 
were people who were unmotivated or unable to seek services to meet their needs.  
Because there were no reliable demographic data collected for callers during the 
disasters, there was no capability to determine how representative the caller population 
was of the general or evacuation population groups. 
 
Data collection 
Data were collected during each 2-1-1 call and recorded by various types of methods. At 
the 2-1-1 Centers, each call is handled by a person, not by a machine.  Callers identified 
their problems to a staff or volunteer answering the phone. Staff were trained and 
certified for I&R Accreditation. During the disaster, volunteers worked throughout the 
state of Texas at their local AIC to help with the surge of calls. Texas 2-1-1 services 
were available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, with roll-over capability to meet disaster 
needs regardless of location.  
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Staff entered caller information directly into the 2-1-1 software database.  Volunteers 
logged call information on paper forms, with AICs devising any number of versions with 
up to 8 types of forms per AIC. In winter 2006, TIRN collected the electronic databases 
that had been exported into Excel or text files and stored on CDs. The paper data were 
copied and stored at TIRN headquarters in Austin. Six AICs had lost both paper and 
electronic data from Fall 2005, so a summary report of calls during the study period was 
used to determine number of calls by date and/or location and/or need.    
 
Coding  
Once the data were received, the paper data were organized by AIC and coded into a 
consistent Excel data file format for each call.  There were 9 AICs with paper data, 
recording approximately 40,000 calls.  A team of 14 student workers took 7 months to 
code the paper data. Electronic data were available from 13 AICs; with approximately 
380,000 calls.  The original Excel files were reformatted into the study data file structure 
and validated, taking approximately 3 months by the 14 students.  The report data from 6 
different AICs were disaggregated to capture individual-level caller data by need, date, 
and/or location.  The total number of 2-1-1 callers in Texas during the 5-month study 
period was 635,983. 
 
Variables 
Caller information was entered into a consistent database format.  A unique 
identification number was assigned to each call plus the AIC that reported it plus the 
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coder’s initials and date coded.  Call date is collected in mm/dd/yy format (32.5% of 
data had no date information).  Caller location information including city, zip, and/or 
county was coded, aggregating to the county level.  If the call was from out of state, the 
state the call was made from was recorded.  (1% of calls were from out of state, 94% of 
calls were from the 254 counties of Texas and 5% of calls had no location information).  
The third variable collected was all information related to the caller’s needs.  The need 
was recorded by the team of students just as it appeared in the 2-1-1 format received 
from the AICs.  Types of needs were documented and then any requests for information 
from Salvation Army, Red Cross, and FEMA were recorded.  Another variable collected 
was any indication of Disaster (DIZ) and then if the DIZ was related to Hurricanes 
Katrina, Rita or Wilma.  All data were reviewed and validated 100% for any mention of 
Red Cross/Salvation Army. 
 
It is assumed that validity, reliability, and consistency of what was coded varied by 
staff/volunteer, shift, date, and other uncontrollable variables. This can be expected of 
any analysis of tertiary data due to the fact that there would be no control over data 
collection.  Nevertheless, the caller information was as close to verbatim of what the 
caller identified, without recall or researcher interviewer biases. However, it must be 
noted that the completeness of the data was biased in 3 ways.  First, the overwhelming 
surge of calls around landfall made it impossible to document each call and thus, some 
information regarding landfall needs and volume was lost.  Second, AICs that lost their 
data were under-represented, with callers from their counties documented only in 
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rollover calls and aggregated summary reports.  Last, two AICs with only report 
summary data (Dallas and Ft. Worth) were not able to reconstruct the date or location of 
caller needs. Thus, the data from these two major evacuation destinations would be 
missing in multivariable analyses, creating a bias under-representing urban evacuation 
needs. Other data collection problems were random, including illegibility and 




Only what was documented was known, i.e., we only know “What” and not “Why”.  
Another limitation for this study included not knowing whether a Salvation Army/Red 
Cross referral was in the caller’s home county or an evacuation destination.  There 
would also be a number of secondary needs that were not captured because the staff 
focused on immediate primary needs.  Nevertheless, this was a remarkable collection of 
“real-time” need information from an unprecedented geographic scope, for both 
hurricane disaster problems as well as evacuation unmet needs.  
 
Analysis 
The data were compiled in Excel databases by the research team and merged for 
analysis.  First, the frequency of Red Cross/Salvation Army needs were tallied. Next 
these needs were described over time during the study period, aggregating into disaster 
phases:  
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 • baseline 
 • pre-landfall 
 • landfall, 
 • immediate post-landfall 
 • short-term post-landfall 
 • short-term recovery 
 • intermediate-term recovery 
 • long-term recovery. 
 
The third stage of analysis was investigating total Red Cross/Salvation Army unmet 
needs during the study period mapped by location (per Texas county), then differences 
in volume and location noted when mapped by disaster phase. The analysis of location 
by disaster phase examined significant differences between the primary and secondary 
disaster areas versus primary vs. secondary evacuation destinations, controlling for 
population size. Last, the analysis of Red Cross/Salvation Army unmet needs by Census 
characteristics empirically tested for variation by county size. 





Texas was involved with the recovery and evacuation of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 
Fall 2005.  Texas 2-1-1 was appointed as the communication hub during the disasters in 
order to link callers to emergency services.  A total of 635,983 calls were recorded by 
Texas 2-1-1 from August 1, 2005 to December 31, 2005.  These calls were coded and 
analyzed by type of need according to location and disaster phase.  Two specific needs 
discussed in this paper are Red Cross and Salvation Army analyzed a) by frequency of 2-
1-1 calls for each unmet need, then the frequency of each b) by location, and c) by 
disaster phase.  Two types of spatial analysis are included: 1) number of 2-1-1 calls per 
county reflecting simple volume of demand for help overcoming barriers to access Red 
Cross and Salvation Army, and 2) volume of calls controlling for urban/rural bias. The 
later analysis controls for population size, measured as number of households per 
county, and enables a comparison across counties of a rate (per 1000 households) of the 
population at risk for access barriers to these first-responder organizations.  
 
Results of total needs 
 
The total number of 2-1-1 calls logged during August 1, 2005 to December 31, 2005 was 
635,983. In the Appendix, the total number of calls were tallied according to location 
(Table A.3.1) and date (Table A.3.2).  Location by unmet need volume in Texas was 
mapped by Texas county and number of needs was graphed by date during the study 
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period and by aggregate disaster phase.  There were three types of first-responder 
organizations coded – FEMA, Red Cross, and Salvation Army.  The total number of 
callers needing help gaining access to first-responder organizations was 8,845, 1.39% of 
total needs. Of these calls for help connecting to first-responder organizations, 30.82% 
were for Red Cross (N=2726), 19.64% were for Salvation Army (N=1737), and 49.54% 
were for FEMA (N=4382). In this thesis, only Red Cross and Salvation Army needs 
were considered. Although the proportion of calls for these first responder organizations 
was relatively small compared to 2-1-1 calls for other unmet needs, the frequencies 
indicate that a number of the population “fell through the cracks” in managing the 
disasters and were in desperate need to connect with Red Cross for help getting shelter 
and to connect with Salvation Army to get access to food and other goods. By analyzing 
these calls for help to gain access to these organizations over time and location, we can 
determine when in the phases of disaster were there greater access barriers and more 
unmet needs as well as where these occurred in relation to counties at the disaster sites 
versus evacuation destinations.  Tables A.3.1 and A.3.2 show total 2-1-1 calls by 
location and date [see appendix A.3.1 and A.3.2].  
 
Results over time 
 
In Figure 3.1, the number of calls were plotted per day throughout the study period 
(8/1/05 – 12/31/05) for Red Cross and Salvation Army.  The peak time period of 
requests for help to contact Red Cross was 9/26/05 (N-167/day, 6.13% of the total 2-1-1 
calls for Red Cross).  This peak occurred two days after Hurricane Rita made landfall in 
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western Louisiana and eastern Texas.  Calls per day to Salvation Army also peaked on 
9/26/05 (N=85/day, 4.89% of the total for Salvation Army).  This high demand for help 
connecting to these first-responder organizations continued for 10 days from 9/26/05 to 
10/05/05 and then dropped considerably.    
 
There had been high numbers of 2-1-1 calls needing help to gain access to Red Cross 
and Salvation Army three days after Katrina made landfall when evacuees were sent into 
Texas.  Requests for help to access Red Cross services started on 9/01/05 with 82 calls 
per day to a low of 40 calls per day, then rose again as more evacuees came into Texas.  
It is interesting to note that there were few sporadic calls for Red Cross help prior to 
8/29/05 and after 10/30/05.  Thus, 2-1-1 was able to help overcome access barriers to 
Red Cross during the acute phases of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and into short-term 
recovery.  
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In contrast, unmet Salvation Army needs were fewer than for Red Cross but more 
continuous prior to Katrina until beginning of December.  The first peak for 2-1-1 calls 
to help access Salvation Army occurred the same day as that of Red Cross, 9/01/05, and 
continued in a similar pattern as calls for Red Cross.  Salvation Army peaked during 
Rita’s immediate post-landfall phase, again at the same time as the peak of demand for 
help contacting Red Cross.  Although these patterns were similar, the number of 
Salvation Army requests were about half those for Red Cross during immediate landfall 
and post-landfall.  Beginning 10/31/05, six weeks after Rita landfall, Salvation Army 
and Red Cross calls per day returned to call rates similar to those during the baseline 
period. 
 
Although during disaster periods Red Cross had about double the amount of requests of 
Salvation Army, prior to Katrina’s landfall and then six weeks after Rita’s landfall the 
number of 2-1-1 calls were considerably higher for Salvation Army than for Red Cross.   
 
Salvation Army had significantly more average calls per day than Red Cross during the 
Baseline stage, 25 days prior to landfall.  During evacuation, however, Red Cross had 
approximately double the average number of calls per day during both Katrina and Rita 
than Salvation Army did.  Throughout immediate post-landfall, Red Cross had slightly 
more calls than Salvation Army, however; during Rita, Red Cross had almost double the 
average calls per day.  After approximately a month post-Rita’s landfall, Red Cross had 
fewer calls per day than Salvation Army. During intermediate recovery, Red Cross 
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average calls per day decreased largely to 1.36 calls per day, while Salvation Army 
average calls per day remained higher at 9.17.  During Long-Term Recovery, both Red 
Cross and Salvation Army average calls per day decreased to 0.81 and 2, respectively.   
 
Thus, the number of 2-1-1 calls to help gain access to Red Cross services was greater 
than calls for Salvation Army during the acute disaster phases as would be expected. The 
spike of calls for Red Cross help following the first few days of emergency sheltering for 
Rita victims could indicate a problem in discontinuing Red Cross services too early for 
these devastating storms or in lack of communication to Katrina evacuees displaced yet 
again for Rita. After the second week of high demand for help overcoming barriers to 
Red Cross services, calls dropped considerably then dwindled to few if any calls during 
the recovery period. Either Red Cross increased their outreach to victims at this time or 
the evacuees were redirected to FEMA as Red Cross began to withdraw its services for 
hurricane victims in Texas. In contrast, demand for help to access Salvation Army 
services rose slightly during the acute disaster phases, indicating good outreach and 
communication to victims to direct them to Salvation Army resources. The demand for 
help to access Salvation Army for two more months into recovery may have needed 
greater outreach and communication, but these calls were limited in number and would 
be easily managed by 2-1-1.  
 
In Figures 3.2 and 3.3 and accompanying Tables 3.1 and 3.2, average calls per day for 
Red Cross (Figure 3.2) and for Salvation Army (Figure 3.3) were compared by disaster 
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phase for Katrina vs. Rita. Requests for help gaining access to Red Cross services were 
significantly higher during Hurricane Rita than Katrina except during early recovery. 
This perhaps reflected Katrina evacuees becoming Rita victims if they had evacuated to 
east Texas Gulf coast or metropolitan Houston area. The highest average daily number 
of Red Cross calls was during the urgent phase 4-7 days following both hurricanes when 
evacuees would traditionally begin preparing to return home and emergency shelters and 
first responders would begin to withdraw. Thus, availability of Red Cross services was 
decreasing and 2-1-1 calls for help gaining access to Red Cross reflected increase in 
unmet needs for their services. There were minimal requests for Red Cross services after 
4 weeks post-Rita.  Requests for help overcoming access barriers to Salvation Army 
were higher for Katrina evacuees once they were transported to Texas after 3 days post-
landfall. Their 2-1-1 requests for Salvation Army help continued to rise until 
compounded by early evacuation for Rita. The peak of 2-1-1 calls for Rita evacuees 
needing access to Salvation Army services occurred as expected in the first few days 
immediately after landfall.  Then as Rita evacuees were mobilizing to return home and 
deal with recovery, their unmet needs for Salvation Army began to reduce. Salvation 
Army requests continued throughout recovery, both as a component of disaster support 
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Results by location 
 
Out Of State 2-1-1 Calls for Red Cross:  Caller location at the time of the call or 
destination where s/he was looking for help was logged by one or more indicator – 
county, city, zip, highway location. These were aggregated to the county level to reflect 
the jurisdiction for many types of support and emergency services. Aggregating at the 
county level also served to protect anonymity of callers when the data were analyzed by 
specific need by date by any of the 254 Texas counties. Ninety percent  (N=2462) of the 
Red Cross calls were from within Texas and 3%  (N=80) were out of state calls.  A 
majority of Louisiana calls 1.39%  (N=38) and 0.40%  (N=11) from Mississippi related 
to Katrina recovery and evacuation.  Less than one percent of all calls (N=20) were from 
Florida having to do with Hurricane Wilma later in Fall 2005.  Other 2-1-1 out of state 

















Out of State 2-1-1 Calls for Salvation Army:  Salvation Army calls were only from five 
other states – Louisiana  (N=9) and Mississippi (N=4) regarding Katrina, with Florida, 
Maryland and Michigan each having only one call about Salvation Army unmet needs. 
Number of Texas calls for Salvation Army needs is listed per county in Appendix 1. 
Less than one percent of the total 2-1-1 Texas calls were for help to overcome access 
barriers to Red Cross and Salvation Army, nevertheless the total of 4463 for these first 
responder organizations was important to plan for future emergencies to reduce barriers 
for access to these urgent disaster service organizations. 
 
Table 3.3 Red Cross Out of State Calls, Katrina-Rita, Fall 2005, 
Texas 
STATE NUMBER CALLS PERCENT OF TOTAL 
LOUISIANA  38 47.50% 
FLORIDA  20 25.00% 
MISSISSIPPI  11 13.75% 
MARYLAND  3 3.75% 
GEORGIA  2 2.50% 
ARKANSAS  1 1.25% 
ILLINOIS  1 1.25% 
MAINE  1 1.25% 
MICHIGAN  1 1.25% 
NEW MEXICO  1 1.25% 
WASHINGTON  1 1.25% 
TOTAL OUT OF STATE  80 100% 











Red Cross Unmet Needs by Texas County: High volume of 2-1-1 calls requesting Red 
Cross were found in counties with the state’s highly populated metropolitan areas, 
namely, Tarrant (Ft. Worth), Dallas (Dallas), Bexar (San Antonio), Travis (Austin), and 
Harris (Houston), as shown in Figure 3.6 that is a map of the volume of 2-1-1 calls for 
Table 3.4 Salvation Army Out of State Calls, Katrina-Rita, Fall 
2005, Texas 
STATE NUMBER CALLS 
PERCENT OF 
TOTAL 
LOUISIANA  9 56.25% 
MISSISSIPPI  4 25.00% 
FLORIDA  1 6.25% 
MARYLAND  1 6.25% 
MICHIGAN  1 6.25% 
TOTAL OUT OF STATE  16 100% 
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Red Cross, Harris County alone accounted for 29.74% of all Texas calls for Red Cross. 
This was not surprising given the number of both Katrina and Rita evacuees the area. 
The other large metropolitan areas were also high as expected, given that they were 
major evacuation destinations for both hurricanes.  Tarrant County received 3.26% 
(N=89) Red Cross calls, Dallas County received 6.30% (N=172), Bexar County received 
6.13% (N=167), and Travis County received 7.63% (N=208).  Other urban areas along 
evacuation routes were also high in number of 2-1-1 calls for Red Cross. It is interesting 
to note in Figure 3.6 the volume of 2-1-1 calls follow the route north from Beaumont/Pt. 
Arthur to Tyler and the route northwest out of Houston along Highway 6 to Highway I-
35 that took evacuees south to Waco, Austin, San Antonio and north to Ft. Worth and 
Dallas. Other urban areas more distant from the disaster sites had small to moderate 
number of 2-1-1 calls for help gaining access to Red Cross. This might reflect evacuees 
who sought destinations with family or friends in Texas. The number of calls from rural 
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To control for the urban/rural bias of population size, the number of Red Cross calls 
were adjusted by population size according to number of households per county.  This 
adjusted call rate reflected the location of populations at greater risk for access barriers 
to Red Cross services, regardless of population size. In Figure 3.7 map of this adjusted 
call demand, only the counties directly hit by hurricane Rita were “hot spots” for 
needing help to gain access to Red Cross services, namely, Jasper, Newton, Orange, 
Hardin, Tyler, Sabine, and Jefferson.  Residents of these counties were over two to three 
times more vulnerable than expected with unmet needs to connect with Red Cross 
services. The adjustment by population size reduced the urban bias for the other 
metropolitan and urban evacuation destinations. Thus, greater outreach and media 
attention for referrals to Red Cross were needed for disaster locations. Access barriers to 
Red Cross were encountered in urban evacuation destinations, but did not exceed 
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Figure 3.7  Unmet Needs for Red Cross per Texas County Adjusted by Population, 
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Salvation Army Unmet Needs by Texas County: similar to Red Cross, 2-1-1 calls to help 
overcome access barriers to Salvation Army were more prevalent in the major 
metropolitan counties (with the exception of Lubbock County, which had a local 
Salvation Army program occurring during Fall 2005 called “Heat the Town”).  These 
counties, namely, Dallas (Dallas), Bexar (San Antonio), and Harris (Houston) together 
account for 25.39% (N=441) of total Salvation Army Calls, as shown in Figure 3.8 map 
of total volume of 2-1-1 calls for Salvation Army.  Dallas with 7.48% (N=130) calls, 
Bexar with 6.62% (N=115) calls, and Harris with 11.28% (N=196) calls.  Travis, 
Tarrant, Jefferson, Taylor and Tom Green Counties also had significant number of calls 
per county.  The volume of calls is quite strong along evacuation routes from 
Beaumont/Pt. Arthur through East Texas up to Dallas.  Counties surrounding the major 
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Figure 3.8 Volume of Unmet Needs for Salvation Army per Texas County, Katrina-

















Like the adjustments made for Red Cross to control rural/urban bias, Salvation Army 
calls per county were divided by population size according to number of households per 
county.  Figure 3.9 shows the distribution of the adjusted call rate that indicated location 
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of areas at greater risk for access barriers to Salvation Army services.  Again, Lubbock 
County and the surrounding areas might be an anomaly due to the fact that there was a 
local program occurring during the study period.  Taylor County, where Abilene is 
located, had a higher than average caller frequency.  The map also showed that the 
counties in the area affected by the hurricanes were prepared for the needs of callers, due 
to the fact that the calls adjusted by population were at an expected rate of less than 1.0 
call per 1,000 households or less.   (Also see Table 3.7) 
 
 
      
Figure 3.9  Unmet needs for Salvation Army per Texas County Adjusted by 
Population, Katrina-Rita, Fall 2005 

















Red Cross and Salvation Army had similar areas of high call volumes in the “population 
triangle” created by Dallas, Houston and San Antonio.  Jefferson County, hit by 
hurricane Rita, also had high call volume for both organizations.  Additionally, the areas 
leading from Jefferson and Harris Counties along evacuation routes towards Travis and 
Bexar Counties and other routes towards Dallas and Tarrant Counties also had a notable 
call volume.  Locations along evacuation routes could be an area for Red Cross and 
Salvation Army to examine while preparing for hurricanes or evacuations in the future.  
While obvious needs such as gasoline are expected during emergency evacuations, these 
first responder organizations could, for example, prepare for elderly people that may 
need to stop and rest more often than younger adult evacuees.  Setting up shelters and 
food stations along the evacuation routes is also something Red Cross and Salvation 
Army could consider for the next time.   (Also see Table 3.8) 
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In adjusting for urban/rural population differences, the urban evacuation hubs had 
expected ratios of 2-1-1 callers after taking into account population size measured as 
number of households. However, east Texas disaster counties along the Gulf coast and 
inland following the path of Rita had much greater than expected demand for help 
reaching Red Cross services. Jasper County had over three times the expected rate and 
the surrounding counties had two times greater or more than expected calls, given their 
population size. In stark contrast, the high-risk counties for unmet needs for Salvation 
Army calls were in west Texas, both to help displaced evacuees as well as help gaining 
access to local Salvation Army program initiatives. Hence, Red Cross and Salvation 
Army in the highly populated metropolitan areas in Tarrant, Dallas, Travis, Bexar and 
Harris Counties were able to absorb the needs of evacuees and were all at or below 
expected levels of calls when adjusted by population.  This showed that the more 
scarcely populated areas closer to the disaster area were not adequately able to keep up 
with needs of evacuees.  In the future, Red Cross and Salvation Army might allocate 
more goods and services to the more rural areas around the area of disaster in order to 
ensure that evacuees have food and shelter.  This number might also be high due to the 
fact that evacuees opted to relocate closer to home instead of going further away to a 
metropolitan area.  In this case, long-term recovery needs would have to be met.  Lastly, 
evacuees trying to return to their home in the evacuated area might be seeking needs in 
more stable communities.  In this case, perhaps Red Cross and Salvation Army could 
locate recovery centers in surrounding communities that help evacuees return home and 
provide food and shelter while they attempt to recover and rebuild their homes. 
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In summary, Fifty-six percent of Texas counties had no calls for Red Cross and 63% had 
no calls for Salvation Army.  These counties with no calls were, for the majority, located 
in west Texas outside of the five counties with metropolitan areas (Bexar, Tarrant, 
Travis, Dallas and Harris), evacuation destinations, shelters, and evacuation routes.  
Fifty-six percent of 2-1-1 calls for Red Cross were located in the metropolitan counties 
of Bexar, Dallas, Harris, Tarrant and Travis, and 33% of calls for Salvation Army were 
within these 5 counties.  Thus, the volume of unmet needs to connect with Red Cross 
and Salvation Army were concentrated in the urban areas that served as evacuation 
destinations and in the disaster counties. But once population size was controlled, the 
Rita disaster sites had the greatest risk for unmet needs to access first responder 
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Purpose/objectives 
The purpose of the study is to examine unmet needs for help from Red Cross and 
Salvation Army during hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Fall 2005 in Texas.  Little 
information is known about access barriers to these organizations’ services.  Using 2-1-1 
data from over 635,983 2-1-1 calls collected in “real time” before, during, and up to four 
months following Katrina-Rita, unmet needs for Red Cross and Salvation Army services 
can be measured.  By analyzing the unmet needs for these emergency services over time 
and location, better planning will be possible to ensure effective distribution of services 
and resources.   
 
Methods 
The study population includes all 2-1-1 call data from 8/1/05 through 12/31/05 from the 
25 Area Information Centers in Texas.  Prior to Fall 2005, approximately 8-10% of the 
Texas population had used 2-1-1.  After using 2-1-1 as an emergency communication 
hub for non-emergency needs during the hurricanes, this percentage increased 
significantly.  Limitations of the study included missing populations with lack of 
awareness, people who were able to meet their own needs, and those without access to 
phones.   
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Data collected during each 2-1-1 call were recorded using various types of paper forms 
and electronic software.  Once the data were received, a team of 14 student workers took 
7 months to code the paper data and 3 months to reformat electronic data into a 
consistent format.       
 
To analyze the data, first the frequency of Red Cross and Salvation Army needs were 
tallied.  Next, the needs were broken down into 8 disaster phases to determine when 
peak time periods occur.  Lastly, the data were analyzed and mapped per Texas county 
by volume and then adjusted by population in order to locate areas of “high-risk.”    
 
Findings 
The total number of calls needing access to first-responder organizations was 8,845, 
1.39% of total needs.  Of these calls to first-responder organizations, 30.82% were for 
Red Cross (N=2726) and 19.64% were for Salvation Army (N=1737). The peak time 
period of requests for help to contact Red Cross was 9/26/05 (N-167/day, 6.13% of the 
total 2-1-1 calls for Red Cross).  Calls per day to Salvation Army also peaked on 9/26/05 
(N=85/day, 4.89% of the total for Salvation Army).         
 
Caller location at the time of the call was logged and aggregated to county level to 
determine the jurisdiction for support and services.  Ninety percent (N=2462) of the Red 
Cross calls were from within the 254 Texas counties and 3% (N=80) were out of state 
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calls.  Salvation Army out of state calls consisted of only 0.90% (N=16) of total 
Salvation Army Calls. 
 
A high volume of 2-1-1 calls for Red Cross came from the state’s highly populated 
metropolitan areas of Tarrant (Ft. Worth), Dallas (Dallas), Bexar (San Antonio), Travis 
(Austin), and Harris (Houston).  Volume of calls also had an interesting trend of 
following evacuation routes from Beaumont/Pt. Arthur to Tyler and northwest out of 
Houston to Waco, Austin, San Antonio and north to Ft. Worth.  To control urban/rural 
bias of population size, the number of calls were adjusted by population size.  Residents 
in counties directly hit by hurricane Rita were over two to three times more vulnerable 
for unmet needs to connect to Red Cross than expected. Salvation Army unmet needs by 
Texas county were similar to Red Cross in that they were more prevalent in the major 
metropolitan counties, as well as a large number of calls along evacuation routes.  
Unmet needs for access to Salvation Army were adjusted for population as well, and the 




In conclusion, greater outreach and media attention for referrals to Red Cross were 
needed for disaster locations. Access barriers to Red Cross were encountered in urban 
evacuation destinations, but did not exceed expected levels based on population size.  
The volume of unmet needs to connect with Red Cross and Salvation Army were 
concentrated in the urban areas that served as evacuation destinations and in the disaster 
  43 
counties.  However, once population size was controlled, the Rita disaster sites had the 
greatest risk for unmet needs to access first responder organizations, particularly in the 
more rural areas hard-hit along the path of the storm.  
 
The volume of unmet needs connecting to Salvation Army was primarily concentrated in 
urban areas that were designated as evacuation destinations.  When the population size 
was controlled for urban/rural bias, the map showed that the counties in the area affected 
by the hurricanes were prepared for the needs of callers.    
 
Red Cross recommendations 
In the future, Red Cross could possibly locate more supplies and shelters in the actual 
sight of the disaster location, rather than large surrounding communities.  While the 
large metropolitan areas were able to absorb the needs of evacuees that relocated there, 
smaller communities were left with a larger demand per population.  As seen in the 
maps, there was a heavy volume of Red Cross calls along routes from the location of the 
disaster to major metropolitan areas.  In order to meet needs of those travelling to a safer 
destination, perhaps the Red Cross could locate more supplies and support services along 
these evacuation routes during evacuation periods.  Lastly, the Red Cross can seek 
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Salvation Army recommendations 
 
While the Salvation Army did not have any areas that were over expected call rates, 
there were similar patterns to those of the Red Cross, which showed the areas directly hit 
by the hurricanes were at higher risk for unmet needs for calls to Salvation Army.  
Salvation Army could consider setting up shelters and food stations along evacuation 




In the future, perhaps 2-1-1/TIRN could implement a more uniform method of recording 
calls so that future unmet needs can be more quickly identified.  This would allow first 
responder organizations to be more prepared with supplies and support services in the 
necessary locations.   
 
Disaster management recommendations 
Based on the findings, future planning for disaster management could possibly focus on 
increasing availability of supplies and support services both along evacuation routes and 
in areas directly affected by the disaster.  Additionally, disaster management might 
consider allocating more resources to areas outside of densely populated areas in order to 
strengthen the abilities of smaller surrounding communities.          
 
 
Future research recommendations 
 
In future research, studies could be conducted to evaluate more specific demographics, 
such as age, income, sex, etc. to more specifically target areas or populations of “high-
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risk.”  Additionally, discovering if information is known about 2-1-1/Red 
Cross/Salvation Army could lead to better publicity and access to the Texas 2-1-1 
Network.         
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APPENDIX 
(American Red Cross, 2009) 
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A.3.1 Calls by Need and Texas 
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A.3.2 Calls by Need and 
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